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Essay: The Integration of International and Domestic
Intellectual Property Lawmaking
by Graeme B. D inwoo die *
It is increasingly imp ossible to analyze intellectual property law and policy without
reference to international lawmaking. That is not, however, merely because several
recent domestic reforms have been prompted by international developments.1 Indeed,
because of significant U.S. influence in the formation of contemporary intellectual
property treaties, U.S. law has undergone less change than most in order to com ply
with newly-assumed international obliga tions. N or is it simply because, in an era of
global trade and techn ological ad vances, a state is unable effectively to regulate
econom ic activity on its own. Rather, the need for a broader awareness flows mo st
directly from the integration of the internationa l and domestic lawmaking processes.
Consider this historica l example. As nations met in Berlin in 1908 to revise the
Berne Convention, the United States received an invitation to attend with “full freedom of action.” 2 Instead, the Register of Copyrights attended only as an observer.3
The reason might now seem und uly quaint. Thorvald Solberg, the Register of
Copyrights
explained to the Conference that the United States found it impracticable to send a
delegate authorized to commit it to actual adhesion to the Berne Convention since some
of the questions to be discussed there were pending before the Congress and premature
action at the Convention might embarrass the legislative branch of the Government.4
To day, in contrast, there is a conscious blending of domestic and international
lawmaking. International lawmaking demands attention to W ashington; and d ome stic
lawmaking cannot be conducted without regard for what is going on in B russels,
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1.
See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998), tit. I (extending term of copyright partly in response to EU Term Directive); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), tit. I (implementing WIPO Copyright Treaty);
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), tit. V (implementing TRIPS
Agreement); Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998), tit.
I (implementing Trademark Law Treaty).
2.
Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright – Past, Present,
and Future, 56 GEO . L.J. 1050, 1057 (1968) (quoting Thorvald Solberg, The International Copyright
Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68, 97 (1926)).
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
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Geneva, Tokyo, and elsewhere. Indeed, in some areas of intellectual property, we may
be moving toward a single lawmaking proce ss that embodies a series of complex
relations among national, regional and globa l institutions and laws.
W ithin the United States, this biplay between national and international fora – in
particular, betwe en exe cutive b ranch activity at the international level, and legislative
activity in Congress – has been treated by some with a certain suspicion. 5 This
interaction is, however, essential in a global age. And it should not be disconcerting.
The Constitution sets out a pro cess for concluding and ratifying treaties, 6 and a
separate process for enacting legislation.7 Each m echanism ha s its own limits. It would
be somewhat surprising if each branch of gov ernment did not use the leverage w ith
which it is endowed by the constitutional scheme. In any event, this blending or
integration of lawm aking is a political reality of which we must take account in our
assessment of how intellectual property law is made.
This Essay addresses the operation of this integrated process in the fields of design
and trade dress p rotection. I will focus on two primary issues, using examples drawn
from recent developments in those fields. First, I will discuss the characteristics of
what has arguably been the predominant form of international lawmaking in recent
years, name ly the pro cess of harmo nization; and, second, I will identify some current
design or trade dress protection issues that may soon be part of this complex
lawmaking p rocess.
I. THE PROCESS OF HARMONIZATION
A. S I M I L A R IT Y

OF

LA W S

A dominant impulse for much recent international lawmaking has been the harmonization of laws. The objectives of harmonization are frequently and easily stated:
reducing the disparities between national laws will reduce the cost, time and
uncertainty involved in determining and/or acquiring rights, thus reducing barriers to
innovation and to global trade.8 Indeed, design pro tection is an area in which these
argum ents resonate with some force because there are few areas of intellectual

5.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT ’L L. 369, 373-75
(1997) (discussing relationship between the “digital agenda” of the Clinton Administration pursued in the
U.S. Congress and that pursued by the Administration in Geneva at WIPO Diplomatic Conference leading
to the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
6.
See U.S. CONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7.
See U.S. CONST . art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
8.
See e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL . PROP. L. REV . 1, 5 (1998) (“The number of trademark registrations worldwide in 1967 was
400,000; by 1992, registrations totaled 1,200,000, a three-fold increase. . . . [I]t is obvious that trademark
owners need speed, certainty, and efficiency in seeking and maintaining their rights internationally.”).
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property law where the applicab le rules are quite so disparate and incoherent.
W ithin the European Union (“EU”), for example, most member states have some
form of special design law. H owever, the e lemen ts of those systems diverge
significantly, even where the elements bear similar labels. 9 These disparities
motivated the Eu ropean C omm ission, in 1993, to propose a directive harmonizing the
registered design laws of the Member States of the EU around a single mo del. 10 This
model offers twenty-five years of protection to aesthetic and functional designs alike.11
An amended version of the directive was recently adopted, and published in the
Official Journal on October 28 (the same date, coincidentally, on which President
Clinton signed the Vessel H ull Design Protection Act.) 12
B. R E P L IC A T I O N

OF

LA W S

A second motivation und erlying harmoniza tion is perhaps less explicitly stated but
is clearly acknowledged. Participants in the process not only wish to make different
countries’ laws look the same, but they also seek to make foreign laws look like their
laws. That is to say, harmonization is often an attempt to replicate rather than to
conciliate – and it is normally the laws of the developed world that are replicated.
Here too, developments in design protection are illustrative. The industrial design
provisions in the T RIP S Agreem ent, 13 which intrude slightly more than the Pa ris
Convention upon the autonomy of states to provide design protection on terms and in
a form of their own choosing, are modeled almost without deviation on the provisions
found in NAFTA.14
Importantly, this desire reveals itself not merely when the moment of
harmonization arrives. The European Commission indicated that one of the reasons
for developing its design legislation in the first place was “to strengthen its hand

9.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protection in
the European Union, 24 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 611, 623 (1996).
10.
See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Design (Dec. 3, 1993), 1994 O.J. (C 345/14) 1.
11.
See Hugh Griffiths, Overview of Developments in Europe on Industrial Design Protection, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359, 370 (1993) (discussing scope of designs covered
by proposals).
12.
See Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection
of Design (Oct.28, 1998), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 1; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.L.No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998), tit. V (Vessel Hull Design Protection Act).
13.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, arts. 25-26, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
14.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1713, 32 I.L.M. 605, 676 (1993).
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internation ally.” 15 The outcome of the harmonization process will be more to a
country’s liking if it can present a ready-made model for international adoption. This
should not be surprising. Nor is it inherently troublesome. It is more time consuming
to deve lop m ode ls from scratch. But it is important to understand that particular forms
of replication are being effected.
C. “H A R M O N I ZI N G

UP ” A N D

DEGREE

OF

S UBSTANTIVE A NA LYS IS

The Design D irective o f the EU also exemplifies the tendency of harmonization
exercises to “harmonize -up,” to mandate higher levels of protection. With few exceptions, the directive did not seek to curtail any of the more excessive forms of
protection availab le for designs in so me E U countries. Instead, it simply required all
member states to make twenty-five years of registered design rights available equally
to aesthetic and functional designs that satisfied a level of ingenuity falling somewhere
between o riginality and novelty.16
This upward trend may not be hugely different from the direction of domestic law.
But the EU design exercise demonstrates that the desire to harm onize can overwh elm
any sub stantive analysis of the merits o f legislative p roposals or any effort to assess
whether an enhancement of pro tection is warranted. Thus, for example, industrial
designs are granted broad copyright protection by some EU Mem ber States. 17 The
continued availability of copyright will realistically undermine any balance that the
Commission embodied in the design regime proper. But restricting copyright
protection for designs would require significant philosophical and political
accommodation and would take time. The internal market demanded more similar
design laws, and it is easier to en act new rights than to curtail existing ones. Y et,
better and more approp riate approximation of the laws of different states might occur
if pursued at more deliberate speed. Past expe rience suggests that the need for speed
may defeat the need to contemplate.

15.
See Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design, Working Document of the
Services of the Commission, Doc. # 111/F/5131/91-EN (1991) ¶ 3.5.2 (copy on file with author).
16.
See Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 651-63 (threshold), 705-07 (term).
17.
See, e.g., Case No. 4 Ob 95/91, Decision of the Austrian Supreme Court (Nov. 5, 1991),
reprinted in 25 INT ’L REV . INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 126 (1994) (protecting design of Le Corbusier
lounge chair under copyright law); see also Marie-Angèle Pérot-Morel, Specific Protection of Designs and
its Relation to Protection by Copyright in French Law, in DESIGN PROTECTION 45, 47 (H. Cohen Jehoram
ed. 1976).
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D. T HE L I M I T S O F H A R M O N I Z A T I O N
European initiatives on design and tra de dress protectio n also highlight the limits
of harmonization as the p rimary instrument of international intellectual prop erty
lawmaking.
1. Supranational Law
First, harmonization of national laws ca nnot avoid the partitioning of markets that
is occasioned by territorial rights, nor can it eliminate fully the costs of applying for
and maintaining serial national industrial property registrations. Thus, when the
European Commission introduced its harmonizing design directive, it also proposed
a Regulation (essentially a federal European law ) that would cre ate unitary EU-wide
design rights, consisting of a three-year unregistered design right and a registered right
that could end ure for twenty-five years. 18
That Regulation has not yet been adopted. But the EU does already offer EU-wide
trade dress rights through a Community Trademark R egistration. This possibility was
introduced by an earlier Regulation, the Trademark Regulation, in 1994.19 And the
Community Trademark Office recently issued its first Community-wide registration
for a three-dimensional product design trade dress, the shape of the LEGO building
block. 20 These supranational laws – both the proposed Design Regulation and the
enacted Tradem ark Regulation – have the potential to achieve the goals of harmonization, but in a much more comp rehensive fashion.
2. Organic Law
Second, harmonizing the text of laws may not achieve a real approximation of
intellectual property rights. The judicial response to a different piece of EU trademark
legislation – the ha rmonization direc tive – illustrates this po int. The definition of
trademark included in the EU trademark harmonization directive expressly referenced
product shape and packaging as trademark subject matter.21 Prior to the enactment of

18.
See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Community Design
(Dec. 3, 1993), 1994 O.J. (C 29/20) 1.
19.
See Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community Trademark (Dec. 20, 1993), 1994 O.J. (L 11)
1.
20.
See Application No. 107,029, CTM Bulletin No. 90/1998, at 57 (Nov. 23, 1998) (copy on file
with author).
21.
See First Council Directive 89/104 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating
to Trade Marks, art. 2., 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 2.
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the Directive, the U.K . courts had d eclined to register shapes of products or containers
as trademarks. Indeed, as recently as 1986, the House of Lords upheld the denial of
trademark registration for the shape of the Coca-Cola bottle.22 Continental courts were
more receptive to the notion of product design trade dress protection.
Since the reforms, U.K. law and continental European law have been ostensibly the
same. But two courts, one in Sweden and one in the United Kingdom, have recently
been confronted with an identical issue: whether Philips has trade d ress rights in the
shape of its three-headed rotary shaver.23 The courts reached wholly different results.
Of itself, this should not be a concern. It may be that the Swedes are more receptive
to visual stimuli than the British, and will tend more readily to identify a product by
its shape. If full-scale harmonization is a goal, however, it is of concern that, identical
text notwithstanding, the British court interpreted the law in a much more restricted
fashion, apparently because of the U.K.’s different tradition.24
It is not a new lesson that real approximation of laws, one that will endure, does not
come from the transplanting of disembodied conce pts. But the pedigree of the lesson
makes it no less valuab le. It is econ omic and so cial contexts that sustain these laws,
and if a similar social setting does not exist, merely harmonizing text may be of little
value.
II. CURR ENT DESIGN AND TR ADE D RESS
ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
In several domestic venues, we might soon witness discussion of trade dress or
design issues that form part of this broader process of lawmaking.

A. V ESSEL H ULL D E S IG N P R O T E C TI O N A C T
In October 1998, Congress enacted the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, and this
has now b een codified as Chapter 13 o f Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 25 This Act, which
might reasonab ly be called the B onito B oats M emorial Act, gives ten years of anti-

22.
See re Coca-Cola Co.’s Applications, [1986] 2 All E.R. 274, 275-76 (U.K. H.L.). The shape
of the Coca-Cola bottle has been registered as a trademark under the new U.K. law implementing the EU
Trademark Directive. See Registration No. 2,000,548 (Sept. 1, 1995). Passing off actions did exist in the
U.K. to protect source-identifying designs and packaging. See, e.g., Reckitt & Colman Prods. Ltd. v.
Borden Inc., [1988] F.S.R. 601 (U.K. H.L.) (lemon shaped container).
23.
See Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods., 1998 R.P.C. 283 (Eng. Ch.); Ide Line
Aktiebolag v. Philips Elecs. NV, [1997] E.T.M.R. 377 (Stockholm Dist. Ct. 1997).
24.
See Philips, 1998 R.P.C. at 299.
25.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), tit. V
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32).
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copying protection to the designers of boat hulls. The legislation is subject to a twoyear sunset provisio n. And in the interim, the Patent and Trademark O ffice and the
Copyright Office will jointly und ertake a study on the operation of the regime. It
would seem inconceivable that this study will not serve as a vehicle for consideration
of a broad-based design protection. Indeed, the current provisions have been drafted
in a way that could, with minimal legislative revision, be converted into a broad-based
regime.
The first model that one would expect Congress to consider would therefore be that
used in the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act. Lo oking at recent legislative activity,
however, the seco nd mode l will be that just deve loped by the EU . The pro tagonists
in the EU legislative process were the same persons fighting over the design legislation in the United States in the late 1980s, and the supporters of design legislation
(such a s car manufac turers) are likely to urge clo se examinatio n of the E U m ode l.
Mo reover, the pressure to enact a broad-based design law along the lines of the EU
model might strategically be increased by claims that the U.S. design patent law does
not co mply with the requirements of TRIPS. The argument would be that Article 25
of TRIP S requires countries to protect designs that are new or original, and that U.S.
design patent law insists on m ore tha n originality. 26 This argum ent is hard ly
incontrovertible, but its force in the domestic context may depend upo n how the
W orld Trade Organization (“W TO ”) disp ute reso lution process evolves. If panels
accord traditional margins of deference to national interpretations, then the U.S. law
might pass muster; if the WTO system becomes more adjudicatory in nature, as was
(to some exten t) its purpose, the issue might be closer. T hus, we see the p otential
interaction of activities at the national, regional and glo bal levels.
B. T RADE D RESS P R O T E C TI O N A C T
A second (p erhap s more spe culative) exam ple of how national and international
events and institutions could converge might be in connection with product design
trade dress protection. The Trade Dress Protection Act27 will likely be reintroduced
in this session of Congress, and would for the first time explicitly provide for trade
dress protection within the Lanham Act. It wo uld resolve a circuit split on how to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress, and it would provide a statutory
definition of functionality. Given the contentious and confused nature of bo th those

26.
See J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT ’L LAW . 345, 375-77 (1995) (outlining argument
of non-compliance).
27.
Trade Dress Protection Act, H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (1998).
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issues, the legislation is not likely to go thro ugh without some d ebate. Inde ed, it is
likely that this legislation m ay be c irculating for som e time b efore enactment.
But one issue that might receive some attention as part of that deliberative pro cess
is whether, in bringing trade dress protection within the b ody o f tradem ark law,
(famous) product design trade dress should receive the same protection against
dilution as word marks. T his issue is currently percolating in the lower courts, most
notab ly in Sun bea m P roducts, Inc. v. West Ben d Co. in the Fifth C ircuit, 28 and in
Lund Trading v. Kohler Co. in the First C ircuit. 29 That topic, of course, raises some
interesting constitutional questions.
But dilution also raises some interesting international q uestions. The legislative
history of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act suggested (incorrectly, I believe) that
dilution protection was endorsed (and perhaps even manda ted) by TRIP S.30 If one
follows the logic of the legislative history – and I don’t accept the premise that TRIPS
mandates dilution protection – then there should be dilution protection for any type
of trademark, whether words or product design. It may be that we have a conflict
between Congress’s interpretation of TRIPS and the constitutional issues being raised
in Lund.31
Mo reover, as an add itional contribution to that deb ate, within the last two years the
W orld Intellectual Property Organization published a largely unnoticed set of model
provisions on unfair competition that are intended to be an “interpretation” of the
Paris Convention obligations to protect against acts of unfair competition – and these
include dilution protection for product designs. 32 In contrast, last year, a U.K. court
in Philips Electronics NV v. Remin gton Consumer Pro duc ts dismissed the notion that
the Paris Convention obliged trade dress protection for product designs, in that case
under Article 6bis, arguing that the drafters of the Paris Convention would not have
contemplated de signs acting as tradema rks. 33
W hat we see here are conflicting efforts to establish interpre tations o f Paris
Convention or TRIPS obligations that over time might am ount to , or influence, state
practice – and that might in turn sway a WTO panel that gives too much weight to the
shift, contemplated by the setting up of the W TO , toward a greater adjud icatory role
for the dispute settlement system. To be sure, it would be hugely ironic, and indeed
quite unlikely at present, for the United S tates (of all countries) to be accused of

28.
123 F.3d 246, 257 (5th Cir. 1997).
29.
163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
30.
See H.R. Rep. 104-374, at 4 (1995) (noting role of international developments in justifying
enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995).
31.
See 163 F.3d at 32.
32.
See MODEL PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION AGAINST UNFA IR COMPETITION (WIPO 1996), art.
3(2)(a)(iv).
33.
1998 R.P.C. 283 (Eng. Ch.).
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insufficient protection of product designs against dilution. This topic, however,
potentially introduces national constitutional issues into the milieu that represents the
new lawma king proce ss.34

34.
The process continues with pending legislation. See, e.g., Legislation: Database Bill is Still
Flawed Administration, Researchers Tell Panel, 57 PAT . TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 418, 419
(Mar. 25, 1999) (reporting the testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, at the Hearing on
Proposed Database Legislation, House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Law, Mar. 18,
1999, to the effect that “database treaty deliberations in the World Intellectual Property Organization are
unlikely to move forward until a U.S. database law is enacted.”). See also id. (reporting the testimony of
Michael Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, to the effect that
“international pressures [such as the EU Database Directive] compel enactment of a U.S. database
protection scheme.”).

